Appendix B: Military Value-added

This appendix is motivated by the question to what extent China's GDP includes military valueadded (and aggregate expenditures include military expenditures).
I am grateful to Beibei Bao who brought to my attention recent changes to (or recently published details for) the calculation of military value-added (National Income Accounts Division, 2010) as well as the intricacies of the 2011 sectoral classification system (NBS 2011) regarding the military.
Thus, in the calculation of value-added, the military appears covered in two respects:
• The tertiary sector sub-sector "Public Administration and Social Organizations" There is also the possibility that innovations in the calculation of military value-added for the purpose of compiling GDP values occurred more recently only. National Income Accounts Division (2010, p. 2) states explicitly that in 2009, following the second economic census, the calculation of nominal value-added of, among others, the Armed Forces, was improved. The "Public Administration and Social Organizations" section of this volume (National Income Accounts Division, 2010, p. 126) makes explicit that "activities of enterprises of the Armed Forces and the Armed Police are also included in this sector."
In the expenditure approach, government consumption includes "recurrent expenditures for national defense" (National Income Accounts Division, 2010, p. 163). In a list of definitions (pp. 163f., in the section on government consumption) a further item related to national defense appears in form of "national defense service expenditures = personnel expenses." No mentioning of national defense (or the Armed Forces) is made in the section on gross capital formation, which would imply that all national defense expenses are regarded as government consumption, and the definition of national defense service expenditures may then hint at two categories of national defense recurrent expenditures, one covering services, and one covering all else.
Otherwise, gross capital formation by the military could be implicitly subsumed in the buildings, equipment etc. categories of gross capital formation.
A revised version of my earlier write-up on military value-added follows, retaining what may still be relevant (in light of the above practices).
According to the 1997 NBS explanations on how it calculates aggregate expenditures, "recurrent" (jiingchangxing) national defense expenditures (guofang zhichufei) are included in government consumption (NBS, 1997, pp. 154ff.); these national defense expenditures explicitly exclude military expenditures that can be converted to civil use projects, such as construction of barracks, military harbors, and military airports. No explanations are provided regarding other national defense investment expenditures (such as for weapons).
In the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) 1993, "offensive weaponry and their means of delivery" are excluded from capital formation and regarded as "defence services" (i.e., government consumption) at the point of their acquisition. The NBS, however, only considers "recurrent" national defense expenditures, which would seem to exclude "offensive weaponry," in government consumption. 2 In the 2008 revision to the SNA, all military expenditures that meet the criteria for capital formation are treated as such-the U.S. currently follows this procedure: in 2012, national defense consumption expenditures accounted for 4.0% of GDP, and national defense gross investment for 1.0 percent. 3 One attempt at estimating military value-added is the following. In the production approach, military VA could be approximated by the VA of military personnel as 'government personnel,' plus the VA created in the production of weapons. The Population Census 2010 reports exactly 2,300,000 military personnel (that are not counted as part of the census summary statistics). If these 2.3m military personnel produced as much VA per person as the employees of the sector "public management, social security, and social organizations," then China's 2010 military service value-added would be 191b yuan, equivalent to approximately 0.475 percent of GDP. 4 Some provincial statistical yearbooks through 2003 in their industry statistics included an industrial sector "weapons and ammunition." In 1998, data were available for eight provinces, with VA of this sector accounting for 0.01 to 0.22 percent of provincial industrial VA. 5 Of these eight provinces, perhaps only one, Shaanxi, is an apparent candidate for defense industries, and the provincial data may not include national defense firms under central control located in Shaanxi. Combining the military employment considerations (previous paragraph) with the limited military industry data suggests that the military value-added that can be directly identified accounts for approximately one percent of China's GDP Estimating military value-added following the expenditure approach, China's national budget of 2010 shows national defense expenditures of 533.337b yuan, which is equivalent to 1.3 percent of aggregate expenditures. 6 No data on off-budget military expenditures are available. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute adjusts the official defense expenditure data to arrive at 2010 military expenditures of 836b yuan, or 2.1 percent of GDP. This does not necessarily imply that China's GDP is underestimated (by underreporting military expenditures), as some military expenditures may be subsumed under other expenditure categories.
